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Design-based research (DBR) is a programme where researchers 
co-operate with practitioners to work out new solutions. In DBR 
researchers interfere in daily life and participate in practitioners’ 
working processes. One open question is: What kind of knowled-
ge can be generated in these projects? My starting point here is 
a DBR project in vocational education and training in Germany 
which is used for an investigation of the epistemological backg-
round of this kind of research enterprise. The characteristics of 
DBR are reflected on the basis of phenomenological and herme-
neutical approaches. The basic assumptions of these concepts 
are introduced and applied to the DBR approach to show how 
DBR generally works and how, specially, features of DBR like par-
ticipation in daily life, co-operation with practitioners, gathering 
knowledge in the field a. s. o. can be handled.
The line of argumentation in this contribution is a radical switch 
between practical questions in daily work in DBR on one hand 
and theoretical re-assurance on the other hand. For resear-
chers, DBR is an enterprise in a new world. The analytical para-
digm does not prepare the voyagers for this journey. Therefore 
the non-analytic continental tradition of philosophy has to be 
re-discovered.
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‘Where no man has gone before!’ 
– Exploring new knowledge in  
design-based research projects:
A treatise on phenomenology in 
design studies
Peter F. E. Sloane
Some preliminary notes on the topic
‘Where no man has gone before!’ is the introductory phrase of 
the Star Trek serial. The audience is asked to accompany the 
star-ship Enterprise on its journey to new worlds. It is an on-go-
ing story of the captain and his crew. The series started with 
Captain Kirk, who was then followed by others. However, one 
quite current question always recurs throughout the series: how 
should the people of Earth react when they find a new civiliza-
tion? On the one hand, they want to learn, as Kathryn Janeway, 
one of Kirk’s successors, always points out. On the other hand, 
there is the so-called prime directive that does not allow them 
to interfere directly because sentient species should live in ac-
cordance with their normal cultural backgrounds.
In the future world of the trekkers, a few things do not seem to 
have changed, or at least, they are quite common for those who 
do research work today. 
The prime directive in some kinds of research is as follows. Do 
not interfere in the field; just make observations to find out how 
it ‘naturally’ works. Getting involved in the field always changes 
it. This is thought of as some kind of contamination. Thus, the 
knowledge that researchers could have gathered becomes spo-
iled. 
Perhaps this is true. Hence, there is a strong belief that you can 
learn by observing and staying at a distance. When you beco-
me immersed in the world of Star Trek, the stories are almost 
always about getting involved in the field. This means that the 
crew members come in contact with new species. They are then 
no longer outside the new world. They are inside where they are 
not only observers but also participants.
Participation is necessary for learning something new. Deep 
understanding is only possible when people from the outside 
come in contact with those inside. They have to cross borders. 
The prime directive interpreted more precisely means that the 
people from the starship have to decide if their appearance in a 
new world will have a negative influence on it.
In our present time, this means that not every visit to a field 
has to be negative. It depends on what you want to learn about 
that field. This contribution is about researchers who are cros-
sing borders to learn something about the world of practitio-
ners. The motivation to go on this journey, where no researchers 
seem to be, is a strong feeling that there is something out there 
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that the researcher wants to learn not only by observing but 
also by participating.
This kind of journey is called design-based research (DBR). It has 
special chances and risks that I will reflect on in this contribu-
tion. I would like to work out that crossing borders and going 
into the world has some implications for research methods and 
methodology.
I will start with a case study on a pilot project my Paderborn rese-
arch group did with vocational schools in Germany. On the basis 
of this research and development approach, I will illustrate the 
characteristics of a DBR concept. For me, one of the fundamen-
tal challenges is that we always assess the quality of this kind of 
research by comparing it to the standards of the analytical rese-
arch approach because this is the mainstream of research in the 
social sciences today. This is an adoption of those methods and 
principles typical for research in (natural) sciences and already 
finds expression in the term social science, ignoring that social 
studies originally have to be applied to a completely different 
field than the sciences. Hence, I think it is necessary to de-const-
ruct the research in social fields and to do some self-reassurance 
on the basics of social studies in real-life settings. This leads to a 
few investigations on humanities. The principles and methods of 
paradigms like hermeneutics and phenomenology enable new 
ways to deal with home-grown problems of current social scien-
ce. Humanities approaches will not be understood as alterna-
tives to rational concepts but as useful supplements in a more 
enhanced research approach.
A journey from theory to practice – Working together 
with schools
Let me start with a typical DBR programme. In a federal Länder 
programme, research and development grants were launched 
to foster self-regulated learning in vocational colleges. My rese-
arch group applied in co-operation with the educational admi-
nistrations of two Länder, Bavaria and North-Rhine Westphalia, 
for funding (cf. Dilger et al. 2005).
At this point, I will neglect considerations of the institutional and 
organisational backgrounds of vocational education in Germa-
ny. In particular, the politically motivated structural support of 
the school system and the possible effects on the pedagogical 
development of schools in these Länder have to be ignored in 
this contribution1. Instead, I will concentrate on the research 
and development process. This can be described in summation 
as follows: 
• Twelve vocational schools participated in this project. In each 
school, a focus group was established consisting of two or 
three teachers who were responsible for a training program-
me. Participating training programmes were: retail salesman, 
nurse helpers, and medical secretaries.
• In Bavaria and in North-Rhine Westphalia, the participating 
schools where co-ordinated by a federal steering group. This 
2.0
1 For more information on this kind 
of programme and the vet system, 
see Sloane and Fischer 2016; Sloane 
2014a; and 2014b.
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group was politically responsible for each of the two Länder. 
This was generally organized by the school administration2.  
• The Paderborn research group participated with the steering 
group. In this context, researchers and educational managers 
had to come to an agreement about what they wanted to in-
itiate in the schools. 
• On the basis of these commitments, the Paderborn research 
group co-operated with the participating schools. 
• The main project idea was to develop teaching and learning 
units to foster self-regulated learning. This carries implica-
tions for school work on three levels:
 ◦ Teaching level: development of teaching units and material 
for teachers
 ◦ Management level: development of course plans for the 
training programme, including a one-year curriculum, se-
quences of training units, instruments for the evaluation, 
etc.
 ◦ School level: programmes for personal and organisational 
development, development of a school concept (e. g. qua-
lity management for the schools’ new mission statements), 
etc.
• Self-regulated learning was not understood as a learning 
strategy to develop the individual vocational competences 
of students in the training programmes. According to an ac-
tion-based approach, the Paderborn group established an 
integrated concept of self-regulated working and learning. 
This corresponds with the so called ‘Lernfeldcurriculum’ (le-
arning field curriculum). This is an interdisciplinary syllabus. In 
vocational education, the traditional specialized subject cur-
ricula (Maths, Business Administration, Law, etc.) have been 
replaced by an interdisciplinary syllabus which is structured in 
action areas (planning a project, buying material, solving the 
customers’ problems, etc.). These areas are problem based 
and integrate subject knowledge (cf. Ertl and Sloane 2003 and 
2004).
• Finally, two different results can be distinguished: a design 
(prototype) and knowledge. Technically, these are two as-
pects of one process. On one hand, a problem has been sol-
ved or something has been designed to solve it. This could be, 
in our case, a training unit to foster self-regulated learning. I 
call this a prototype. It is generally something like a proven 
tool. On the other hand, knowledge is generated. This can be 
a declarative description of the prototype and its develop-
ment. However, it also could be some insight into organisa-
tional processes or knowledge about how things, generally 
speaking, work in school and how they should be done; in 
essence, researchers and practitioners learn how to design. 
Dieter Euler (2014a and b) calls this kind of knowledge ‘De-
sign Principles’. 
2 For North Rhine-Westphalia, it was 
the North Rhine-Westphalian Curricu-
lum Institute, and for Bavaria, it was 
the Bavarian Institute for School Qua-
lity and Educational Research. Both 
are so called ‘Landesinstitute’ (state 
institutes) which are subordinate to 
the Ministries for Education and Cul-
ture of the Länder.
Figure 1: Working structure in a design project
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Figure 1 gives the first insight into the project.
As we can see, a DBR programme is not a simple agreement 
between teachers and researchers. At least in Germany, the 
researchers have to handle different working contexts and are 
confronted with political, organisational, and instructional re-
quirements. Figure 1 shows the main components of the design 
project: 
1. This design-based approach was embedded in a complex pro-
gramme with political, organisational, and instructional impli-
cations. These implications correspond with different working 
contexts.
2. The kinds of methods the researchers implement into this 
programme as well as how knowledge is generated in the pro-
gramme have to be clarified.
3. The working contexts bring researchers together with other 
actors (teachers, administrators, politicians, etc.) and they 
have to look for agreements with these actors. Of course, this 
can be understood as a necessary commitment when conduc-
ting research. In this case, researchers step back and try to 
describe what is going on in the school and in working groups. 
They maybe try to evaluate how successfully things are done 
by the practitioners. However, often they also have to inform 
practitioners, give advice, or present a concept. In the case I 
presented above, the Paderborn group developed an integra-
ted concept of working and learning, and they run a series of 
workshops to enable the practitioners to do their designing. 
This has two implications. First researchers are not only exp-
lainers. They are also consultants. Second, researchers step 
into the field and co-operate in real-life settings with practiti-
oners. I call this joint field of researchers and practitioners an 
arena. The researchers give up their distance from the field 
and become observers and participants.
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4. Finally, the actors in this programme (here labelled as resear-
chers and practitioners) have different interests, norms, and 
attitudes. They do not automatically interpret the joint work 
in the same way, and they likely have different perceptions of 
what the other one should or should not do.
Now we are at the exact point where the journey starts. What 
happens if researchers do not describe what is going on in the 
field with analytical instruments alone? To participate means 
that researchers give up their distance from the field. Does this 
change the way they understand the field, and do they then 
generate a different kind of knowledge? If so, then we have a 
different modality of theory formation, as in the traditional rati-
onal-analytical paradigm. 
In cases like the joint project discussed here, researchers move 
between different social settings. They do not only act in a typi-
cal research environment but also have to work in those real life 
settings that they want to learn something about. This is rese-
arch in a working process. 
How can researchers handle this transition into the field? This 
is the central question. We also have to take into considerati-
on that there is a borderline between researchers and practi-
tioners. Passing this boundary seems to be important, but why 
does it exist in the first place?
Borderlines between knowing and doing
What kind of knowledge are we searching for?
Researchers are seeking knowledge. The basic epistemological 
question behind this statement is: What is knowledge, and how 
can we acquire it?3 At first, it seems to be simple: to express 
what we know about the world in words. In this case, we could 
also explain in words that which we do not know. In common 
life, this is accepted. From a researcher’s point of view, kno-
wing is used in a factual sense. To know means that things exist. 
Knowledge is propositional because things can be expressed in 
sentences. This sometimes is also called declarative knowledge. 
Knowledge can also be procedural. In this case, we are not able 
to express what we know in words or sentences. Michael Pola-
nyi called this ‘tacit knowing’ (cf. Polanyi 1983). In other words, 
we can do things without really being able to express the incor-
porated knowledge in sentences. This implicitness of knowledge 
in the process of doing is not only a matter of awareness. The 
basic question of the relationship between knowing things and 
doing things arises:
1. On an individual level, this refers to the link between indi-
vidual knowledge on one hand and individual activities on 
the other. The simple question is, what do we have to know 
about things when we want to do them? In our tradition, the-
re is a strong belief that doing requires knowledge. In peda-
gogical settings, the consequence is that learners should at 
first gather knowledge so that they can do things. Following 
this approach, common core curricula have been established 
3.0
3 I am referring here to general epi-
stemological positions which are 
common in the philosophy of science 
without mentioning special sources. I 
refer to the argument in the chapter 
‚Epistemology’ in the Internet En-
cyclopedia of Philosophy’. (Source: 
http://www.iep.utm.edu/epistemo/)
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which codify the so-called relevant knowledge. All of this con-
flicts with the daily experience of learning to do things in an 
adaptive process of copying others and/or in a critical and 
self-reflective way of exploring the things.
In modern learning approaches, this has been adopted. Based 
on Piaget’s cognitive theory and later deepened by construc-
tive theories, the sequence from knowing to doing has been 
changed; not doing requires knowledge, but knowledge re-
quires doing.
2. On a systematic level, research has been established as a so-
cial system that aims to collect knowledge about things. The-
se things can be physical, social, biological, or economic. The 
result is on one side a specification of sciences and studies 
(academic disciplines).4 In society, these academic discip-
lines have a twofold function. On one side, academic disci-
plines are knowledge archives of society. Researchers collect 
knowledge about all things. On the other hand, they transfer 
this knowledge to society. Teaching is the mechanism of tur-
ning knowledge into practice. At this point, the educational 
work in universities is in the same trap as grade-school tea-
ching. We have the same question again: is the knowledge we 
develop in universities a satisfactory basis to prepare others 
for that what they have to do in society?
The history of academic disciplines in European universities5 
since the Enlightenment has been a process of professionali-
sing knowledge production. It is, or at least was, part of the 
identity of research in universities to look at the fundamental 
issues of this process. This refers again to the following basic 
questions. What is knowledge? What are the epistemological 
basics when we produce knowledge? What are the external 
effects of knowledge? What happens to society?
Currently, many of these basic issues seem to recede into the 
background. Nevertheless, they are still relevant because the 
answers we provide to them focus on what we do. It seems 
that the answers have been provided, at least for those in the 
research mainstream. 
In the social sciences, this mainstream defines research as 
a rational problem-solving process to generate declarative 
knowledge about existing things. It is up to practitioners to 
decide what to do with this knowledge. This also means that 
the difference between knowing things and doing things that 
was described above as an individual phenomenon has been 
established in a shift between research and practical doing. 
Overall, there is in the Newtonian tradition of science a separa-
tion of research and social life. Maybe this is, in the case of natu-
ral science, not really a problem, but in the field of research on 
social activities or social life, this tradition leads to a segregation 
between knowing and doing. Of course, there are approaches 
that try to bridge this gap. 
In the German discourse, this refers to the pilot project appro-
ach (cf. Sloane 2008; Sloane and Fischer 2016). According to 
the English discourse, this kind of approach can be described as 
4 The term ‘science and studies’ is 
quite difficult to understand. I am 
referring to academic disciplines like 
sociology, medicine, biology, etc. In 
my opinion, these are social systems 
with specific rules and regulations. I 
will revisit this later. At the moment, it 
seems to be important that we under-
stand that these academic disciplines 
which also exist outside universities 
as a group assignment have a social 
function in society. 
5 In this case, this includes US univer-
sities and refers to a long and ongoing 
process that started in Bologna and 
was continued in Coimbra, Prague, 
Oxford, Cambridge, Heidelberg, Paris, 
Jena, and others.
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so-called ‘Mode 2’ research, which was established as a comple-
mentary concept to the traditional ‘Mode 1’ research: 
The old paradigm of scientific discovery (‘Mode 1’) charac-
terised by the hegemony of disciplinary science, with its 
strong sense of an internal hierarchy between the discip-
lines and driven by the autonomy of scientists and their 
host institutions, the universities, was being superseded – 
although not replaced - by a new paradigm of knowledge 
production (‘Mode 2’) which was socially distributed, appli-
cation-oriented, trans-disciplinary and subject to multiple 
accountabilities (Nowotny, Scott, and Gibbons 2016, p. 1, 
see also Gibbons et al. 1994, p. 3ff.).
The borderline is an artefact. It does not need to be there, but 
it exists due to a research tradition. We could now continue to 
try to bridge the gap. Then again, it is quite interesting to take 
a look at other possible research approaches in order to work 
out a completely different concept. For this reason, I will have a 
look at continental philosophy, which can be understood as an 
alternative to the analytical Newtonian process.
Lost routes: Continental philosophy
Continental philosophy is a term introduced in the British dis-
course on philosophy and refers to a widespread series of Wes-
tern European philosophical thinkers and schools, in particular 
from Germany and France. In a narrow interpretation, this refers 
to the late 19th and 20th century and includes German idea-
lism, hermeneutics, phenomenology, existentialism, structura-
lism, post structuralism, and critical theory (cf. Critchley 2001, 
p. 38; Zahavi 2007, p. 7). In a broader sense, the Encyclopaedia 
Britannica links this tradition further back, for instance to the 
German philosophers Kant and Hegel, Fichte and Schelling, and 
the Danish philosopher Kierkegaard (cf. Wolin 2016).
I am surely simplifying the complex philosophical discourse in 
Europe when I now put my contribution on DBR in general con-
trast to an analytical Anglo-Saxon approach6 on one hand and 
continental philosophy on the other hand.7 However, I think that 
the main challenge is to overcome the limitations of the analyti-
cal approach without losing the advantages of this concept. This 
refers in general to humanities as the common reference point 
of continental philosophy.8
Humanities seem to be, in an everyday understanding, an ol-
der approach than the empirical or, in a broader sense, the ra-
tional-analytical concepts. Actually, humanities were always the 
response of rational programmes and not their predecessors as 
the following two interpretations demonstrate:
• Dilthey introduced his concept of hermeneutics as an alter-
native to Kant’s two treaties – Critique of Pure Reason and 
Critique of Practical Reason – as a reasonable third critique 
of historical reason and as a counterbalance to the rational 
programme of science. While Kant evolved the logical process 
of knowledge production based on the forms of perceptions 
6 This approach has roots in the ideas 
of common sense, analytical approa-
ches, etc. and was stimulated by the 
proponents of the Vienna Circle who 
had to leave Germany at the time 
of the Third Reich. Of course, I am 
referring here to Karl-Raimund Pop-
per, who described his experience 
introducing Kant and other German 
analytical philosophers in the English 
discourse. 
7 Quite inspiring here was an essay 
on this contradiction on the blog, 
The Philosopher’s Beard. The author 
states: ‘Analytic philosophy is rati-
onalistic: rigorous, systematic, lite-
ral-minded, formal (logical), dry, and 
detached. It is modelled on physics 
and maths and is particularly popular 
in the Anglo-Saxon world. Continen-
tal philosophy is humanistic: reflexi-
ve, literary, essayistic, charismatic. 
It is modelled on literature and art 
and is particularly popular in France, 
Germany, and Latin America. These 
two traditions dominate contempo-
rary philosophy, and they are largely 
mutually incomprehensible. This is 
unfortunate since their strengths and 
weaknesses are somewhat comple-
mentary’. He is entirely correct.
8 An overview of the ‘classification of 
science’ in European discourses can 
be found in Bambach 1995, p. 70f.
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(time and space) in his Critique of Pure Reason, Dilthey cons-
tructed the process of understanding (Verstehen) as an indi-
vidual operation where someone empathises with someone 
else and engages oneself. Hermeneutics means to find out 
what happens to yourself when you are engaged. It is a mo-
vement from the perspective on an object (Kant) to concern-
ment by an object (Dilthey). In the rational case, a researcher 
explains what he observes, and in the second case, he descri-
bes what affects him.
• In the phenomenological movement (Husserl, Heidegger, 
Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, etc.) the mentalist tradition (Kant) was 
also denied. Edmund Husserl argued that (natural or positive) 
science ‘cannot in principle understand or do justice to the 
human subject’ (Tietzen 2016, p. 17). For Husserl, knowledge 
production in philosophy is completely different than in natu-
ral sciences. Science is oriented on objectivity. The initial po-
sition in a phenomenological approach is the ineluctability of 
‘being-in-the-word’9 (cf. Heidegger 2006), which includes that 
a person (subject) is always linked to a horizon of meaning (cf. 
Merleau-Ponty 1945, p. III–IV; 1966, p. 5f.).
After all, there seem to be alternatives. The sketchy depiction 
stated here points out that the discourse in humanities is bran-
ched out widely. Hence, I will concentrate on the phenomeno-
logical movement and a few complementary aspects of the her-
meneutic approach and the critical theory in the following.
The Phenomenological Movement
Life-world approach
In the case study above, schools (practitioners) and universities 
(researchers) are two different ‘life-worlds’.10 Consequently, this 
means that researchers and practitioners live in different orga-
nisations with varying rules and obligations. Researchers who 
go into the field to observe schoolwork change into a different 
environment.
A life-world is the real-life setting in which individuals (subjects) 
exist. Edmund Husserl (1996; 1962)11 introduced this concept as 
a counter-project to the natural world in (natural) science. It is 
‘the world as immediately or directly experienced in the sub-
jectivity of everyday life, as sharply distinguished from the ob-
jective “worlds” of the sciences, which employ the methods of 
the mathematical sciences of nature; although these sciences 
originate in the life-world, they are not those of everyday life’ 
(Life-world 2016). 
Alfred Schütz adopted Edmund Husserl’s conception: 
The sciences that would interpret and explain human 
action and thought must begin with a description of the 
foundational structures of what is prescientific, the reali-
ty which seems self-evident to men remaining within the 
natural attitude. This reality is the everyday life-world […] 
Only in the world of everyday life can a common, commu-
nicative, surrounding world be constituted. The world of 
9 For the English reception of Heideg-
ger’s term ‘being-in-the-world’, see 
the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philoso-
phy 2016. 
10 In principle, it is quite tricky to 
translate the German phenomenolo-
gical terminology into English. ’Wor-
ld-life’ is the translation in the Ency-
clopaedia Britannica. Cf. Life-World 
2016. In preparing this contribution, 
I tried to find out how the German 
terms are used in the English-spea-
king discourse and grasped as many 
phrases as possible. It is not rare that 
the authors use the original German 
term; often they struggle to find the 
correct translation, exceedingly when 
German authors like Heidegger and 
Husserl use language games to ex-
press their thoughts.
11 Manfred Sommer (1980, p. 42) 
points out that the term life-world 
was brought into a wider public th-
rough Heidegger’s analyses of Hus-
serl’s contributions.
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everyday life is consequently man’s fundamental and pa-
ramount reality. 
(Schütz and Luckmann 1973, p. 3. German original: Schütz 
und Luckmann 1979, p. 25. The authors refer explicitly to 
Husserl’s conception. The footnote was omitted in this cita-
tion.)
In radical thought, nobody is able to escape from everyday life. 
The idea of objectivism of the (natural) science approach is ulti-
mately a fictional thought from somebody in his or her life-wor-
ld. We are always, according to Heidegger, in-the-world. His 
already above-mentioned term ‘being in-the-world’ is from his 
main work, Being and Time. Heidegger emphasises:
‘The “essence” of being there lies in its existence’ (Heidegger 
2006, p. 42). Only people exist and are able to reflect on their 
existence (cf. Zahavi 2007, p. 46). Following Heidegger’s argu-
mentation, this means that each individual is the centre of his li-
fe-world. To illustrate this, it is reasonable to pick up Heidegger’s 
differentiation of ‘space’ and ‘body’.
Spatiality in Heidegger’s phenomenological approach does not 
mean the Cartesian concept of space. It refers to a space that 
emerges through doing things (cf. Heidegger 2006, p. 102ff). 
Only by using things is one able to figure out sense. The cont-
ext of use focuses not on existing things but on the pragmatic 
contact of someone with the things. Dealing with objects makes 
them functional and gives them sense. 
What does that mean for DBR? From a phenomenological per-
spective school work does not exist as an ‘unchangeable’ ob-
ject. It emerges for the researcher through his interactions with 
actors in school. In the project I refer to, this means e. g. that 
researchers go into school, participate in schoolwork or estab-
lish working groups with teachers and others from the so-called 
‘school world’. The interaction between researchers and prac-
titioners is the basis to construct knowledge about this ‘school 
world’.
Therefore, the phenomenological approach establishes, in ad-
dition to a physical spatiality, an action-based concept of spa-
ce. An individual12 is the centre of this space, which also implies 
that there has to be something that perceives the space. This 
leads to the concept of body. There is a long-going discussion in 
philosophy about the link between the natural (physical) body 
and mind. In the phenomenological approach, mind and body 
seem to be two perspectives of the same object. In the ratio-
nal tradition, a dualism of body and mind as well as of subject 
and object is stated. Heidegger disagrees with this assertion.13 
For him, objects are always phenomena in perception of a sub-
ject, and the body is something like a resonance chamber of the 
‘outside’ world. For Heidegger, this includes that human beings 
are bodily. Thus Heidegger (1979, p. 8ff) writes in his lessons on 
Nietzsche:
We do not “have” a body; rather, we “are” bodily. […] Most 
of what we know from the natural sciences about the body 
and the way it embodies are specifications based on the 
12 I am referring here to an individu-
al person knowing that Heidegger, 
for example, concentrates on human 
being as the starting point. The term 
‘human being’ is my translation of 
Heidegger’s term ‘Dasein’ in the book 
Being and Time. In English contribu-
tions, the German term ‘Dasein is 
used. Heidegger’s fundamental star-
ting point is the differentiation in a 
general being of all things (Sein) and 
the special being of humans (Dasein) 
or human beings (to use the correct 
English term). Only people (individual 
persons) are able to reflect and think 
about themselves. Thus, they are a 
special kind of being. Maybe they can 
be called reflective beings, but what is 
important is that from the phenome-
nological point of view, these mindful 
subjects are part of the world. To be 
precise, they cannot step out of the 
world, but they reflect it and are, as 
I will discuss following Heidegger, the 
centre of the life-world. 
13 At this point of the contribution, an 
excerpt about dualism as the basic 
assumption of the rational approach 
would be interesting. However, this 
is not possible in this contribution. I 
will only sum up Heidegger’s position. 
He thinks that there is no distinction 
possible between the subject and the 
world that this subject is embedded 
in (cf. Heidegger 2006). Everything 
refers back to the subject and has to 
be de-constructed in the perspective 
of the subject. The result is that truth, 
knowledge, etc. are always part of the 
subject. The dualistic position that 
the object exists outside of the sub-
ject or without the subject is a simple 
fiction or, in modern terms, a const-
ruction of the subject.
EDeR 10Volume 1 |  Issue 1 |  2017 | Article 04
established misinterpretation of the body as a mere natu-
ral body.
In a similar meaning, Merleau-Ponty speaks about the bodily 
being (cf. Merleau-Ponty 2002). In both approaches, this bodily 
being (Merleau-Ponty) or this living body (Heidegger) is the cen-
tre of the individual’s life-world. The fundament again is Hus-
serl and his differentiation between the lived body and physical 
body. There is a grand debate on this aspect in the literature. 
The main idea is a Phenomenology of Embodied Subjectivity (cf. 
Jensen and Moran 2013). 
In an action-based approach to space, the subject perceives his 
world by doing things. These activities are situated and are ex-
perienced through the body as a resonance chamber. An examp-
le sometimes used in the literature to illustrate this perception 
is a person who uses his hand and arm to touch something. The 
experience is that the person and his hand and arm perceive 
something and that this is accompanied by a familiar feeling. A 
numb arm feels unfamiliar and leads to an external perception 
of the arm (cf. Zahavi 2007, p. 72f).
This can be understood as doing something in a situation. Being-
in-the-world can be interpreted as being connected in the he-
re-and-now of a situation and receiving what happens (cf. The 
Cambridge Companion to Heidegger 1992, p. 23). The situation 
is a context of life (Lebenszusammenhang) and a natural flow of 
experiences. It comprises (a) an event (Ereignis) and not a pro-
cess (Vorgang), (b) is relatively closed (Geschlossenheit), and (c) 
never detached (Unabgehobenheit).
The first-person perspective and the ‘encounter of the 
others’
As the phenomenological approach neglects dualism and ob-
jectivism, the protagonist considers a ‘first-person perspective’. 
This is not only a psychological concept according to the diffe-
rence between ‘I talk’ (first-person perspective) and ‘he talks 
about that’ (third-person perspective) but in particular a tran-
scendental approach (cf. Zahavi 2007, p. 17).14 The situation and 
the person are inseparable connected (cf. Merleau-Ponty 1966, 
489). This has a narrative and an epistemic characteristic.
The first- and third-person narrative refers to the viewpoint 
of argumentations. By using the third-person narrative, the 
subjects suggest a neutral description of the things as if there 
were no subjectivity in the thoughts put into text. In contrast, 
the first- person narrative connotes an individual position. The 
thoughts are connected to a person and the text, and thus the 
documented thoughts seem to be subjective. 
The epistemic aspect is about inter-subjectivity. Indeed, the 
phenomenological concept stresses the individual embodied 
thinking of a subject in his life-world. Following the train of 
thoughts of Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and others as 
done here, only the perceiving subject can develop certainty 
about his thoughts. The outside world is a reflection in the re-
14 In the transcendental philosophy, 
ontological concepts are developed 
on the basis of what we know. It is 
epistemic, and we have to take here 
into consideration that in the phe-
nomenological tradition, this is not 
thought of on the basis of Descartes’ 
dualism but as an embodied percepti-
on of the subject.
4.2
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sonance chamber of this subject. The question arises: how can I 
know what others know, and how can I be sure that these others 
know what I know (cf. Zahavi 2007, p. 67f)? This is also one ma-
jor criticism of Jürgen Habermas (1988), who pointed out that 
language is a necessary fundament for a dialogue between sub-
jects. This has to be taken into consideration to avoid a solipsi-
stic trap. Therefore, it is important to work out how the others 
and their perceptions are conceptualized in a phenomenological 
concept. This has something to do with the question of whether 
inter-subjectivity exists in the phenomenological approach. 
In the DBR project which I here refer to we developed among 
other things learning arrangements (learnAr) to foster self-regu-
lated learning. According to the mentioned working structure in 
this project (see Figure 1), the researchers informed the practiti-
oners and moderated the focus groups who had to develop this 
prototype (learnAr). They visited the teachers in school when 
they implemented the arrangements and they discussed the re-
sults and teachers’ experiences after the implementation. The 
researchers’ experiences were not only based on information on 
the process or through evaluation of the results; also the cor-
responding activities of researchers and practitioners influen-
ced them. From the researchers’ point of view, discussions with 
practitioners but also the communication between participating 
researchers lead to some kind of general understanding about 
what is going on in theses projects. This is at the first sight a 
narrative and gives the impression of story telling. But it has also 
some kind of evidence because the stories have rules, become 
structured and explain indeed what is going on in this world of 
practitioners. On a second sight this means (a) empathy exists 
as a mode for discovering knowledge, (b) the narratives are put 
into words and thus have been put into texts and (c) there are 
different perspectives in the field.
Thus three responses are possible referring to inter-subjectivity: 
empathy, textual reality, and the second-person perspective.
On Empathy
For Max Scheler (1973, p. 25f), empathy is the ability of human 
beings to become infected by the emotions of others. This is cal-
led emotional infection (Gefühlsansteckung). It is not a cognitive 
perception, but it is an emotional reaction. ‘The process of infec-
tion presupposes no knowledge of the cause or the origin of the 
emotional mood’ (Ranly 1966, p. 43). This concept of empathy is 
based on the deep involvement of the subject. Referring to the 
terms used above, this can be seen as a kind of non-cognitive 
perception in the individual resonance chamber.
Edith Stein (2016, p. 33ff) interprets emotional infection as a 
theory of imitation. Further modes of empathy are in her con-
cept the theory of association (cf. ibid., p. 37ff ) and the theory 
of conclusion by analogy (cf. ibid, p. 40ff). Sensitive understan-
ding therefore appears in three modes:
• As imitation: I suffer with someone else
4.2.1
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• As association: I remember myself suffering the way someone 
suffers
• As conclusion by analogy: I see myself suffering
In all three modes, I have to reflect on my own feelings to find 
out what is going on with the other. This is an experience of 
others and makes it possible for me to bring this experience to 
mind. Then, a dialogue with the other could start to give me 
insight into the other’s life-world.
The mentioned work on developing learnAr had phases where 
the researchers had to give advice. They were consultants. Re-
searchers as counsellors not only give information but also have 
to re-construct the problems in this case of the teachers, work 
out the background of the problem in co-operation with the tea-
chers and develop strategies together to solve the problem. In 
the daily work of our project this leads to situations where the 
researchers not only thought about things happening in a cogni-
tive mode that had to be documented. They were involved and 
often understood what was going on in school on the basis of 
the mechanism here called sensitive understanding. Interesting 
and important is in fact how these consultant experiences of the 
researchers can be transformed into the knowledge production 
of the DBR approach. We try to handle this with the writing of a 
research journal and with discussion groups. In both cases, the 
idea is to reflect in a writing process on their own experiences in 
the field. Texts are produced.
 
On Textual Reality
The consequence of being-in-the-world is not only an individual 
life-world. We share situations with each other, which means 
that we share interpretations (cf. Cicourel 1974) and backgrounds 
(cf. Garfinkel 1999). Meaning in everyday life is linguistically dis-
tributed and is manifested in texts. According to Hans-Georg 
Soeffner (1983, p. 39ff; 1986, p. 140), social reality is mediated 
textually. This assumption finds its radical proponent in Jacques 
Derrida (1986): there is no outside-text. Everything has to be put 
into a textual form or it does not exist. 
In a daily work of a DBR project the matter of text production 
is not as existential as Derrida points it out but in an ongoing 
research programme only those things can be taken into consi-
deration which have been put into words. Thus producing texts 
is really important. I will come back to this point later on (see 
Figure 6).
On the Second-Person Perspective
In the last decade, researchers from the field of neuroscience 
and social cognition have integrated the idea of the ‘first-person 
perspective’ into their approaches. They try to combine the rati-
onal approach (third-person perspective) and the phenomeno-
logical one (first-person perspective) (cf. Galagher 2001; 2008; 
Zahavi 2001). The intention is to establish connections between 
4.2.3
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the insight view and the outside explanations. This is called the 
second-person perspective.
While the first-person perspective refers to an introspective 
approach and the third-person perspective defines the other 
as an object, the second-person perspective accepts the other 
as an individual with a consciousness. Understanding someone 
therefore means to get into a personal interaction between at 
least two subjects: ‘It is through immediate perception of, and 
embodied interaction with others that we gain our primary ex-
perience of their feelings and intentions, without recourse to 
inner theories or simulations. This approach focuses on the ex-
pressive bodily behaviour, inter-bodily resonance, intentions as 
visible in action and the shared situational context in order to 
explain social understanding’ (Fuchs 2016).
Or in the words of Alfred Schütz, social activities are ‘face-to-fa-
ce encounters’ (cf. Schütz 1967, p. 162).
These face-to-face-encounters were typical in the DBR project 
which I refer to. Discussing the implementation of learnAr for 
example always leads to a communication where the resear-
chers’ third perspective has to be matched with the practitio-
ners’ first perspective. 
The examples for empathy, textual reality, and second-person 
perspective from one work process in the case study illustrate 
what inter-subjectivity in phenomenological approach refers to. 
It is not the idea of implementing research methods to receive 
identical results like it is understood in the Cartesian approach. 
Inter-subjectivity refers to a matching of experiences of actors 
in a communication process between researchers and practitio-
ners as well as between researches involved in the project itself 
or in similar projects. 
Uncovering structures: Epoché and reduction
Life-worlds are mediated linguistically and textually. These ut-
terances are indexical in both intention (sense or meaning) and 
extension (reference). In a structuralism sense, they are a surfa-
ce structure. The underlying deep structure can be discovered 
through phenomenological reduction (cf. Garfinkel 1999, p. 4; 
Bergmann 2000). This is possible by a process of suspending jud-
gements and situational implications and influences. This bra-
cketing should help the subject cast off prejudices; thus, we can 
concentrate on the phenomenon (cf. Zahavi 2007, p. 22). This 
leads to structural knowledge or, referring to Berger and Luck-
mann (2011), to social constructions. Husserl (1962, pp. 154, 
238) calls this a transcendental reduction (or epoché), and he 
distinguishes between noema and noesis. Both terms refer to 
the originally Greek term ‘nous’ (mind). ‘Noema’ can be under-
stood as the content of the perception. It is the result of thinking 
(thought). ‘Noesis’ is the mental act of thinking that leads to the 
content or, more simply, the result of the thinking:
4.3
Figure 2: From outside to inside – Teacher actions as examples of gene-
rating knowledge in the phenomenological approach
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Figure 2 is a brief overview of how knowledge is generated in 
the phenomenological approach. Based on the example of a 
teacher’s activities in the documented case above, the following 
implications become visible. The activities of a teacher are em-
bedded in his life-world and textual presentation. Typical texts 
are: a teacher’s diary, video-documentation, a notice from a par-
ticipating researcher, etc. From the researcher’s point of view, 
all of these utterances are noematic contents he perceives and 
reflects on. Technically, the noematic content is a kind of men-
tal representation of the outside object that is transmitted from 
thinking (noesis) to knowledge (noema). 
This is indeed not very far removed from the Kantian position. 
Kant (1781) emphasizes in his treaty on pure knowledge that 
all knowledge is based on perceptions and transformed by the 
intuition of space and time into real knowledge. Husserl as well 
as Kant saw a shift between thinking and thought. In Kant’s con-
ception of dualism, thinking is the subject that generates an ob-
ject as perception-based knowledge. This implies that the truth 
lies outside the person and establishes empirical evidence. The 
person itself is in Kant’s approach a fiction on the basis of thin-
king (cf. Kant 1781, p. 278) because ‘the subject has no knowled-
ge of himself’ (Ibid, p. 350, author’s translation). Husserl now 
puts the ‘dualism’  into the person because the internal process 
of thinking refers to noematic content. This content is already in-
tra-personal. In this case, the implication is that truth lies inside 
the person, and subjective or internal evidence is established. 
The person in this case is also a fictional subject. 
From an analytical point of view, the creation of knowledge is a 
profound matter because the rules of constructing knowledge 
are vague. If bracketing is seen as rational, then there is an ex-
pectation of a rule like the following:
a ∈ A with A = { a: T(a)}
Read: a is an element of the set A, and set A comprises all 
which have the attribute T(a).
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This interpretation of ‘bracketing’ would be rational and empi-
rical and would refer to the extension (scope) of the concept. 
However, noema is not a rational construction, and noesis is 
more intuitive than rational. Thus, we are not skipping elements 
but are trying to distil sense. Dan Zahavi (2011) emphasises that 
Husserl called this a shift in the reflection. This is like a sudden 
insight and has a totally different purpose than a rational de-
construction. It is focussed on the intension (meaning) of the 
concept.
Explanation and understanding: Crossing borders again
Finally, Jürgen Habermas (1981, p. 180)16 works out the differen-
ce between explanation and understanding:
1. An explanation is sought by observing everyday life. This is an 
analytical concept; an explainer analyses from a distant posi-
tion. This person is outside the situation, analyses it from this 
point of view, and wants to receive neutral information about 
what is going on in the situation.
2. Understanding is sought by participation in everyday life. This 
is a hermeneutic concept; understanding means participati-
on. The person who follows this approach is inside the situa-
tion and therefore gives up the distance.
Referring to Heidegger (2006, p. 105), bodily embedded recepti-
on is exactly a matter of distance. In his concept, human beings 
are not able to attain distance17 from their life-worlds. ‘Being-
in-the-world’ implies that we cannot escape from a situation. In 
the words of Sartre (1993, p. 562ff), the embodied perception of 
the individual is the absolute centre of the situation.
Jürgen Habermas contrasts the phenomenological approach 
of understanding as a process of participating in the situation 
with the analytical approach of explaining the situation from a 
distance. These are indeed two completely different paradigms. 
Logically, you only can work with one or the other concept. Re-
searchers can use both paradigms. They can shift from one to 
the other, but they cannot slide them into one another. 
If we refer to the work in design projects and similar co-ope-
rations between research and practitioner groups, we have to 
understand that from the researchers’ point of view, both mo-
dalities are possible, but they have to be distinguished. Werner 
Kirsch (1997, pp. 152–160) emphasises this in the style of Ha-
bermas as a separation into two life-worlds: the research world 
and the practice world. These worlds are incommensurable as 
already mentioned: you can only be in one or the other world 
but not both worlds at once. Both worlds differ according to the 
acting persons, the culture, and the existing rules (institutional 
structure), as seen in Figure 3.
16 Jürgen Habermas would likely not 
see himself as a phenomenologist, 
but I summarize his position under 
the concept of continental philoso-
phy and see him in this position as 
an opponent to rational-analytical 
positions. 
17 Heidegger uses the term ‘distance’. 
This is ‘Entfernung’ in German. He 
writes it as ‘Ent-fernung’, which leads 
to a different interpretation because 
the word stem ‘fern’ means far away. 
The prefix ‘Ent-’ makes this an oppo-
sing phenomenon similar the English 
prefix ‘dis-’. Thus, distance is used in 
the sense of being near even if the 
term ‘Enfernung’ in common German 
simply means the distance between 
two points.
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If we refer to the work in design projects and similar co-operations between research and 
practitioner groups, we have to understand that from the researchers’ point of view, both 
modalities are possible, but they have to be distinguished. Werner Kirsch (1997, pp. 152–160) 
emphasises this in the style of Habermas as a separation into two life-worlds: the research 
world and the practice world. These worlds are incommensurable as already mentioned: you 
can only be in one or the other world but not both worlds at once. Both worlds differ 
according to the acting persons, the culture, and the existing rules (institutional structure), as 
seen in Figure 3. 
 
Acting persons Competence (capability and knowledge) of the persons. Their 
capability to act successfully in the life-world. 
Culture Social knowledge of the persons. Their capability to interpret the 
life-world correctly. 
Existing rules Social order in the form of norms and institutions (mostly implicit). 
Regulations on interactions in the life-world. 
Figure 3: Differentiation of the life-worlds – Research and practice (Source: Kirsch 1997) 
 
The basic assumption of the phenomenological approach is the unalterable fact that 
everybody is integrated in a life-world, and nobody is able to dissolve out of it. This is the 
fact of existence, and implies that being-in-the-world is the starting point of every kind of 
reflection on the social world. This world is not a world of objects but a world of doing. Thus, 
subjects discover it by acting. The body of the subject is the recipient of all activities in the 
social world, which then implies that knowledge is linked back to the body. The living body is 
the holistic counterpart of the physical body. As a consequence, truth and evidence have to 
be found inside the subject. Bodily thinking is a resonance chamber for the outside world. 
Of course, the phenomenological terminology and the daily experience in DBR projects seem 
to be quite different. But this is in the end due to the fact that these are two different life-
worlds. What the phenomenological approach according to the working process of 
researchers in DBR points out is that these researchers change the life-world. When the 
researchers of my group go into schools as they do in the case study described they have to 
accept the existing rules and understand the culture in this ‘school’ world; they have to 
locate the acting persons, the often implicit hierarchy, and the sometimes informal 
obligations in this world.  
Some examples show how important this is: The researchers had to find out the role of the 
headmasters in the participating schools, they had to understand how informal groups in the 
different schools react, they had to learn how the participating teachers define their roles in 
the process a. s. o. And it is not only important to know these things which often seem to be 
quite simple. But at the beginning of the co-operation with schools researchers cannot really 
know what really is important. They have to find the right questions and locate the 
structures of the ‘school’ world.  
Unfortunately, there often is no manual of relevant questions researchers can take with them 
when they explore the ‘school’ world. Thus in the here-mentioned case we had to learn how 
Figure 3: Differentiation of the life-worlds – Research nd practice (Source: Kirsch 1997)
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The basic assumption of the phenomenological approach is the 
unalterable fact that everybody is integrated in a life-world, and 
nobody is able to dissolve out of it. This is the fact of existence, 
and implies that being-in-the-world is the starting point of every 
kind of reflection on the social world. This world is not a world of 
objects but a world of doing. Thus, subjects discover it by acting. 
The body of the subject is the recipient of all activities in the 
social world, which then implies that knowledge is linked back 
to the body. The living body is the holistic counterpart of the 
physical body. As a consequence, truth and evidence have to be 
found inside the subject. Bodily thinking is a resonance chamber 
for the outside world.
Of course,  p n l i terminology an  the daily ex-
perience in D  rojects seem to be quite different. But this is in 
the end due to the fact that these are two differe t life-worlds. 
What the phenomenological approach according to the working 
process of researchers in DBR points out is that these resear-
chers change the life-world. When the researchers of my group 
go into schools as they do in the case study described they have 
to accept the existing rules and understand the culture in this 
‘school’ world; they have to locate the acting persons, the of-
ten implicit hierarchy, and the sometimes informal obligations 
in this world. 
Some examples show how important this is: The researchers 
had to find out the role of the headmasters in the participating 
schools, they had to understand how informal groups in the dif-
ferent schools react, they had to learn how the participating tea-
chers define their roles in the process a. s. o. And it is not only 
important to know these things which often seem to be quite 
simple. But at the beginning of the co-operation with schools 
researchers cannot really know what really is important. They 
have to find the right questions and locate the structures of the 
‘school’ world. 
Unfortunately, there often is no manual of relevant questions 
researchers can take with them when they explore the ‘school’ 
world. Thus in the here-mentioned case we had to learn how 
the schools work and what really goes on there. Of course we 
were prepared by research results but that only could help us to 
get into the school. Bodily thinking as the phenomenologists call 
it now means that we participate as human beings with other 
human beings. Going into school takes us, the researchers, into 
a situation where we are part of the interaction, for example 
with teacher groups or with headmasters. They have to un-
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derstand what is going on. According to Figure 2 we generate 
knowledge in a process in which we generate structures of the 
‘school’ world. In the phenomenological terminology this me-
ans that a mental act of thinking (noesis) takes place where we 
transform an embodied reception (noematic content) into a me-
aning structure (noema).
Putting this idea into the daily work in design research this refers 
to a situation where I am confronted with a strange surrounding 
and try to find out how things work in this situation. Examples 
are: the first meeting with headmasters or the focus group. 
Now, to avoid a solipsistic trap, it is necessary to understand how 
an individual person can have certainty about others and how 
people can be sure that they talk about the same things and 
understand things in the same way. As the phenomenological 
approach assumes that human beings live in a social world, they 
have joint experiences. Inter-subjectivity is not thought of as ha-
ving the same result according to knowledge about objects, as 
in the world of natural things. Instead, in a world of doing, in-
ter-subjectivity refers to acting experiences. Consequently, this 
leads to an approach of co-activities or corresponding activities.
Following this line of thought, the interaction between subjects 
is important. As a variation of Heidegger’s ‘being-in-the-wor-
ld’, this can be paraphrased as ‘going-into-the world’. Thereby 
emerges the idea that researchers go into the world of practitio-
ners to find out what is going on there.
Knowledge Searchers in the World of Practitioners 
Booty from practice: Design principles and other useful 
things
According to Dieter Euler (2015, see also Euler and Sloane 2016), 
DBR projects are built up as revolving co-operative work-pro-
cesses of practitioners and researchers. The iterative cycle has 
phases: (1) identifying and clarifying the problem, (2) theoretical 
foundation, (3) development of the design, (4) testing and for-
mative evaluation of the design, (5) creation design principles, 
and (6) intervention and summative evaluation.
I want to pick out two phases from this circle: the theoretical 
foundation and the creation of design principles. In an idealistic 
view of this circle, researchers are involved in these two phases 
and play an active part in the work. The theoretical foundati-
on can be understood as input, for example, via a workshop or 
talk with the practitioners. The creation of principles expels at 
the reduction process. The researchers have to bracket all sub-
jective influences and irrelevancies and define the central idea 
or general structure. One quite interesting aspect of these two 
working contexts is their similarity to the two possible modes of 
hermeneutics in Hans-Georg Gadamer’s (1972) treaty on Truth 
and Understanding. Understanding and applying are the two 
perspectives (cf. Di Cesare 2009, pp. 122ff) of the hermeneutic 
approach. Understanding can be seen as the act of deconstruc-
ting the design activities to find the general structures (subtilitas 
5.0
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to a situation (subtilitas applicandi). From a hermeneutic point of view, a situation is always a 
special case of a general principle. On one hand, these principles can be constructed on the 
basis of a case, while on the other hand, cases are applications of knowledge. This is indeed a 
circle of understanding and applying. 
However, researchers are not involved in only these two phases. They only seem to be quite 
obvious for reasons of co-operation. Additionally, the researchers can and will be involved in 
the other phases. It is quite important to define the role of researchers in all phases of the 
design circle. At minimum, they will be observers, and according to Edith Stein’s concept of 
empathy, they will be involved emotionally in what is going on in the work process. 
A special feature of DBR is the development of concrete solutions to explicated problems. 
Principles such as general knowledge of situations are used to focus on problems. However, 
this knowledge is not codified only as principles. You find it incorporated in the material 
developed in the design process. Figure 4 illustrates the types of products on hand of the 
introductory case. This was on the development of instruments, material, syllabuses, etc. to 
foster self-regulated learning. 
 
Background 
Design studies in 12 schools in a period of 4–5 years 
Dissemination through further education for 5–8 years 
Adoption of new educational programmes (running at the moment, planned for 5 years) 
M
at
er
ia
l (
Pr
ot
ot
yp
es
) 
Narrative learning situations 
Teaching and learning units 
Media and material 
Alternative diagnostic approaches 
Concept for the development of courses 
Annual plans for vet programmes 
Concepts for further education 
Structure models (didactical approach) 
- for designing process-oriented 
courses 
- for designing learning situations 
and learning units 
Principles of sequencing of learning 
situations and didactic units  
Principles for the measurement of 
competences 
Concept for the implementation of the 
programme  
Principles for the implementation of 
courses 
D
es
ig
n 
Pr
in
ci
pl
es
 
Manuals for the school work 
Development of new syllabuses 
Companions to handle typical problems 
Publication 
Documentation 
Figure 4: Booty from practice – What researchers found in a project (a selection) Figure 4: Booty from practice – What researchers found in a project (a selection)
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intelligendi). This is similar to Edith Stein’s concept of empathy 
(see above 3.2.). In contrast, to apply means the application of a 
theory or knowledge to a situation (subtilitas applicandi). From 
a hermeneutic point of view, a situation is always a special case 
of a general principle. On one hand, these principles can be con-
structed on the basis of a case, while on the other hand, cases 
are applications of knowledge. This is indeed a circle of under-
standing and applying.
However, researchers are not involved in only these two phases. 
They only seem o be quite obvious for reasons of c -operati-
on. Additionally, th  resear hers can and will be involved in the 
other phases. It is quite important to define the role of resear-
chers in all phases of the esign circle. At minimum, they will be 
observers, and according to Edith Stein’s concept of empathy, 
they will be involved em tionally in what is going on in the work 
process.
A special feature of DBR is the development of concrete solu-
tions to explicated problems. Principles such as general knowled-
ge of situations are used to focus on problems. However, this 
knowledge is not codified only as principles. You find it incor-
porated in the material developed in the design process. Figure 
4 illustrates the types of products on hand of the introductory 
case. This was on the development of instruments, material, syl-
labuses, etc. to foster self-regulated learning.
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The above figure gives an impression of what kind of knowled-
ge is generated in DBR programmes. The working framework of 
the case is added, and it is visible that the development of the 
material is based on an ongoing working process of more than 
ten years. That is, in my opinion, quite typical for this kind of re-
search programme. They need time and have different phases. 
In this particular programme, the first development phase was 
nearly five years long, followed by an initiative to disseminate 
the results. This dissemination process gave some insight into 
different contexts and made it necessary to modify the material. 
At the moment, we are adapting our results to a new program-
me with a slightly different target group. All of this work leads to 
a differentiation of our knowledge.
Challenges of ‘going into the situation’
Language and Text in Life-Worlds
Summing up the previous thoughts, it can be emphasized that 
researchers have to implement different working processes into 
co-operation with practitioners. This was already framed in Fi-
gure 1. In more detail, this can be seen as a range of different 
tasks researchers have to master. Working in the field means ch-
anging the life situation and makes it necessary to cope with the 
rules that exist in this field. It also includes, according to Figure 
3, learning about the relevant knowledge and understanding the 
cultural settings.
Researchers are confronted with these, and they will have to 
learn to understand these perspectives of the field. They recei-
ve indexical phenomenon (contextual utterances) and have to 
transfer these into general structures. This is a process of in-
terpreting the received contents. The utterances are narratives 
and refer to typical situations. Finding typical structures makes 
bracketing necessary. Only when these structures are found will 
it be possible to work out nomothetic knowledge. This implies 
that every empirical approach is based on a phenomenological 
recognition of a structure.
Thus, a differentiation between structural and nomothetic 
knowledge is necessary. While structural knowledge links con-
textual utterances to general patterns, nomothetic knowled-
ge can have three different emphases: statement, reason, and 
justification (cf. Terhart 1981, p. 769). This is quite similar to a 
distinction in Gestalt psychology. There, you find a discriminati-
on in ontological and nomological information according to the 
structure of the elements of a field (ontological) and the rela-
tionships between the elements of this field (nomological) (cf. 
Winnefeld et al. 1957, p. 37f).
5.2
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4.2.2. The Eureka Moment in Life-Worlds 
In German educational theory,18 there is a didactical tradition19 of forming the students with 
educational contents. The idea is that learners are affected by these contents and that they 
build up capabilities, abilities, motivation, etc. Wolfgang Klafki (1963)20, a main proponent of 
the educational theory, described this as a culminating fruitful moment in which the subject 
has a deep insight into the content. For Klafki, this is the result of a ‘double-sided exploitation’. 
In the traditional German concept of ‘Bildung’,21 an exploitation is normally considered. A 
subject (formal perspective of the educational process) exploits an object (material 
perspective of the educational process) and picks up the incorporated sense. This 
exploitation is in the humanities tradition seen as a double-sided process, as at the same time 
the object also exploits the subject. Dealing with content fosters knowledge and leads to 
capacity enhancement. This enhanced competence then retroacts on the way the individual 
now deals with the content. The view on the content has generally changed. This is a circular 
process that is compatible with the phenomenological approach. 
The double-sided exploitation can be described as bodily reception of mental content. Noesis 
implies that the general meaning of the content is distilled. The educational interpretation 
now is that this retroacts on the reception of the content. It is noteworthy that this is seen as a 
fruitful culminating moment of change. This idea was introduced originally by Friedrich 
Copei (1960), who himself was influenced by Edmund Husserl. He emphasizes that there is 
																																																								
18  I am referring here to a humanities concept of education called the educational theory or in German, 
the Bildungstheorie. 
19  For insights into the German tradition on ‘Didaktik’ as a ‘reflective practice’, see Wesebury et al. 
2000 passim. 
20  For an English introduction to this conception, see Klafki 2000. 
21  Roughly, this can be translated as education, but it means far more in the German expression, as I 
will try to show. 
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The Eureka Moment in Life-Worlds
In German educational theory,18 there is a didactical tradition19 
of forming the students with educational contents. The idea 
is that learners re affected by these contents and that they 
build up capabilities, abilities, motivation, etc. Wolfgang Klafki 
(1963)20, a main proponent of the educational theory, described 
this as a culminating fruitful moment in which the subject has 
a deep insight into the content. For Klafki, this is the result of a 
‘double-sided exploitation’. In the traditional German concept 
of ‘Bildung’,21 an exploitation is normally considered. A subject 
(formal perspective of the educational process) exploits an ob-
ject (material perspective of the educational process) and picks 
up the incorporated sense. This exploitation is in the humanities 
tradition seen as a double-sided process, as at th  same time 
the object also exploits the subject. Dealing with content f sters 
knowledge and leads to capacity enhancement. This enhanced 
competence then retroacts on the way the individual now deals 
with the content. The view on the content has generally chan-
ged. This is a circular process that is compatible with the pheno-
menological approach.
The double-sided exploitation can be described as bodily recep-
tion of mental content. Noesis implies that the general meaning 
of the content is distilled. The educational interpretation now 
is that this retroacts on the reception of the content. It is note-
worthy that this is seen as a fruitful culminating moment of chan-
ge. This idea was introduced originally by Friedrich Copei (1960), 
who himself was influenced by Edmund Husserl. He emphasizes 
that t ere is an ‘original moment in which new knowledge awa-
kes in us like a lighting, a new mental content grips us’ (ibid., p. 
17. Author’s translation, P. Sl).
This is a priori knowledg . It is a eureka moment, which is the 
sudden understanding of what is going on, for example, in a si-
tuation with practitioners.
Eureka moments are not so seldom in design research. In the 
project I refer to, we often had these moments in workshops 
18 I am referring here to a humani-
ties concept of education called the 
educational theory or in German, the 
Bildungstheorie.
19 For insights into the German tra-
dition on ‘Didaktik’ as a ‘reflective 
practice’, see Wesebury et al. 20 0 
passim.
20 For an English introduction to this 
conception, see Klafki 2000.
21 Roughly, this can be translated as 
education, but it means far more in 
the German expression, as I will try 
to show.
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with practitioners. In these meetings often two or three resear-
chers from the Paderborn group participate. The research group 
develops the programme of the workshop on the basis of fee-
dbacks from the practitioners. During the workshop itself, one 
of the researchers moderates the discussion or some kind of 
working process while the others are participant observers. The 
practitioners’ explanations are often long-winded, cumberso-
me, and full of details. They go and lose themselves, sometimes. 
And in these situations we often have a moment when one of 
the researchers forms a pattern to generalise the ideas of the 
practitioners. This is often presented in a panel painting. 
It then is hard to decide if this is the structure of the practitio-
ners’ everyday knowledge or if it is the researcher’s interpretati-
on that slightly differs from this knowledge and therefore maybe 
is a new common view on the practitioners’ experience. At the 
end this ‘ownership’ question of knowledge is in a phenome-
nological approach not the central aspect, as the world in this 
concept is an action field the developed structure is common 
knowledge in the working group.
Topoi: Patterns of the Life-World
In Figure 5, I mentioned the term ‘topoi’. It refers there to the 
logic of stories. In the Aristotelian poetic, a topoi is an action 
pattern, and in literature, it is the typical motif of the story. We 
have implicit knowledge of these frameworks. This regularly 
expresses itself in our reception of stories, fictional as well as 
non-fictional. For example, in our culture we know quite well 
what happens when Romeo meets Juliette. We can interpret it 
dramatically as inevitably tragic and also as some kind of nega-
tion. In the second case, a comedy could be formed if Romeo 
were to climb up to the balcony and fall down. To defend against 
the motif changes, the story in this case may change from dra-
matic to comedian.
Participating in practice gives researchers the possibility to ex-
perience social interactions and find out, maybe in one of these 
eureka moments, why things work the way they do because all 
of a sudden, an action pattern may become visible. In a more 
pragmatic sense, the researchers have to discover the logic of 
the narratives.
Validity
To validate the logic of the narratives, a communicative validity 
is necessary. According to ideas of Jürgen Habermas (1981) on 
communicative rationality, it is essential to find a common le-
vel of communication to discuss the meaning of utterances. As 
already shown, these statements are codified text. Thus, it is a 
matter of communication on and through media that concerns 
text validity. With Ewald Terhart (1981 pp. 773), two communi-
cation levels can be distinguished: a communication between 
researchers and practitioners and one between researchers. 
These are two so-called hermeneutical fields.
5.2.3
5.2.4
Figure 6: Text generating in design-based research projects
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• Hermeneutical field 1: communication and co-operation in 
the arena between researchers and practitioners. 
• Hermeneutical field 2: communication and co-operation in 
the scientific community between researchers.
Hermeneutical field 1 refers to commitments in the arena. The 
actors have to find out if they are talking about the same things. 
The arena has, from the researcher’s point of view, the function 
to gather information. A lot of documentary texts will be pro-
duced here which have to be interpreted. 
The function of hermeneutical field 2 is to link back the experi-
ences won in the arena and validated in field 1 to the knowled-
ge accepted in the scientific community. This has to be seen in 
connection with the hermeneutical interpretation (see 4.1.).
Text Corpus
As seen, DBR projects generate different text types. There are 
texts produced in the arena which have to be validated in her-
meneutical field 1. These are primary texts. Data collections are 
a subgenre of this kind of text. Primary texts are the basis for 
interpretation in the research group. This interpretation leads 
to further texts that I call the secondary texts. These are texts 
generated from primary texts to find more general knowledge. 
Finally, these texts are condensed to those publications that will 
be presented and discussed in the scientific community. Figure 6 
summarizes the text production in the case from the beginning 
of this contribution.
5.2.5
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Beam me up, Scotty – Back at the home base
In Star Trek episodes, especially the older ones, the crew copes 
with a lot of adventures. They learn new things, but at the end 
of each episode, they have to leave. Satisfied with the work 
done, they give their starship a call: ‘Beam me up, Scotty!’ The 
crew then disappears from the surface of the once-strange pla-
net. Captain Janeway, my favourite commander, often takes a 
long look at the planet displayed on the monitor in the ship’s 
bridge before resuming the adventure. It is a short glance back, 
but it also embodies the idea of continuing to somewhere else.
This happens in design research, too. Working together with 
practitioners is always a temporary affair. This implies that rese-
archers have to accept, as well as practitioners, that their joint 
time is limited and that they will part ways after some time to-
gether. It has to be accepted from both that they are people 
from different life-worlds. Therefore, the aims of practitioners 
and researchers are different. This becomes even more import-
ant if we broach the issue of the role and special interests of 
politicians in the arena. 
The main intention of this contribution is to reconstruct design 
research on the basis of a phenomenological approach. As I 
mentioned at the beginning of my argumentation, one problem 
in the communication done in design programmes is the recep-
tion of those who work with the established, analytical, rational 
approaches. Often, the background assumptions are not expres-
sed, which often makes communication problematic because 
questioning the research design then happens without under-
standing the special assumptions in this kind of research work.
Indeed, a long-going tradition of humanities can be claimed 
with sophisticated arguments for why research in the life-world 
of practitioners is possible, fruitful, and reasonable. From this 
point of view, the contribution is an attempt to reflect one’s own 
work in social fields. Therefore, I want to end with a few final re-
marks about those things I could only refer to briefly and those 
things I had to skip. 
1. Participating in social fields is a learning process for resear-
chers. According to the German tradition of didactics as re-
flective practice, this implies that one’s own learning process 
should be reflected.
2. Understanding the social world as a world of doing implies an 
action-based concept of research that also fits with the idea 
of research as learning. Strictly speaking, research is a kind of 
problem-based learning.
3. Co-operations between practitioners and researchers will 
only succeed if both groups have the competence to do this 
work. In my experience, it was often part of the research work 
to prepare the practitioners for co-operation. This is, accor-
ding to the headline of this contribution, a new and additional 
challenge. 
4. In talks and papers on DBR, it often is stated that the com-
munity of practice is far more successful than the community 
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of research when it comes to innovations in practice. I doubt 
this sharpened thesis. This can be true sometimes, but I often 
experienced that in this kind of co-operation, the innovative 
power was the result of good communication and co-opera-
tion where both sides brought in their strengths. This again 
hints at the role of researchers as consultants, critical friends, 
facilitators, knowledge mediators, etc. This also is an invitati-
on to think about the implications of the headline.
5. Finally, the experience with empathy, eureka moments, and 
other things which are common in humanities and strange 
in the analytical approach wobbles the comfortable chair of 
observers who want to stay outside of the world.
Going into fields is an opportunity for researchers. My intention 
was to illustrate how this kind of work can be classified in the 
philosophy of science. My train of thought may sometimes give 
the reader the impression that this is an alternative way of rese-
arch. However, it is not my pretention to stand up for a new pa-
radigm. On the contrary, this contribution should be understood 
as a trial seeking more possibilities to find knowledge. It is not 
a new dogma. 
Following Jean-François Lyotard,  paradigms are contemporary 
grand narratives. Thus, we make narratives about narratives 
(metanarratives). Maybe this explains why it is not necessary to 
cling to one and only one paradigm with the result that other 
approaches are seen as mistakes or worse. My personal opinion 
is that everything is possible. Therefore, in the words of Paul 
Feyerabend: ‘Anything goes’. However, he will not have the final 
say because that has not yet been spoken, as the Enterprise con-
tinues exploring. ‘Beam me up, Scotty!’
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